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Fairness in the WTO Trading System 
Andrew G. Brown and Robert M. Stern 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, we first comment on the fairness of the multilateral trading system as 
conducted under the rules and procedures of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
1 Having 
been dominated until quite recently by a small number of developed countries, the system has 
focused heavily on managing the conduct of trade relations among these countries. Ideas of 
fairness like nondiscrimination and national treatment have played a part in these relations and 
are woven into the system. However, with the great expansion in membership to include most 
developing countries, the distinctly different economic conditions of these countries have put the 
rules and procedures of the system under fresh scrutiny. There is more emphasis on the relevance 
of fairness in trade relations, but these relations also have to be understood in a broader, more 
global setting. However, discussion of the issue so far is lacking in coherence. What we attempt 
in this chapter is to offer a framework within which the fairness of the current system can be 
assessed. 
As  a  first  step,  we  should  state  what  we  understand  by  fairness.  We  do  so  in  full 
recognition that there is no objective, universal definition to which all reasonable persons are 
likely to agree. We begin from a view of fairness espoused by philosophers since Kant and most 
recently by Sen (2009) that finds its roots in the impartiality with which we make judgments 
                                                       
1 The WTO came officially into existence on January 1, 1995, following the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round (1986-1994) of multilateral trade negotiations.  It subsumed the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which was created after WWII and which provided the framework for seven rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations from 1947 to the beginning of the Uruguay Round. 2 
about the distribution of rights and obligations, income and wealth, or other valued attributes. 
Impartiality demands that we put aside our own preferences or prejudices, and that we take 
account of the interests and concerns of others.
2 Arriving at an impartial judgment calls for a 
reasoned scrutiny of the evidence and arguments. However, as Sen (2009) has observed, the 
reasoning need not result in only one judgment. There is “a plurality of unbiased principles” that 
may inform the judgments of reasoning persons. Thus, in the present context of the multilateral 
trading system, there are two widely known underlying principles that vie with each other for 
primacy – the utilitarian principle and the principle of economic equity. The former is explicitly 
or implicitly favored by most mainstream economists, but we hew to the latter as the more 
persuasive and relevant. As discussed more fully later, we see economic equity as composed of 
two subsidiary principles: equality of opportunity and distributive justice.   
Were  the  rules  and  procedures  of  the  multilateral  trading  system  the  outcome  of  an 
impartial process, they could be declared to be fair (by some impartial standard). As we know, 
however, they have emerged from numerous rounds of negotiations among countries that not 
only have diverse interests but also differ greatly in bargaining power. However, because the 
system is based on voluntary cooperation, considerations of fairness have never been entirely 
absent from these negotiations (though neither have they been dominant). 
It is through the successive rounds of negotiations that a fairer system can gradually be 
realized. If the initial position was unfair, then the rounds of negotiations, if fair in themselves, 
                                                       
2  Rawls  (1971)  realizes  impartiality  in  his  theory  of  justice  as  fairness  by  postulating  an  “original 
position” in which participants decide on a system of justice before they know what their position in 
society will be. 3 
should lessen the distortions and move the system toward greater fairness.
3 But what constitutes 
fair negotiations? Trade agreements reached through multilateral negotiations amount to binding 
contracts that confer certain rights and obligations on all the participating countries. The process 
of  negotiation  is  critical  for  the  fairness  of  the  outcome.  In  principle,  the  extent  to  which 
participants respect each other’s autonomy and engage willingly in the reciprocal exchange of 
benefits goes far toward defining the fairness of the process. As we know, however, and explore 
later, respect for autonomy and reciprocity is by no means always present. 
We begin our discussion with a brief critique of the utilitarian principle as a guide to 
fairness  in  the  world  trading  system.  We  then  turn  to  the  alternative  of  economic  equity, 
exploring the meaning of its two components: equality of opportunity and distributive justice. 
We thereafter proceed to discuss the conditions of autonomy and reciprocity that have to be met 
in order to realize greater fairness in multilateral trade negotiations. Next, we comment briefly on 
aspects of procedural justice that are necessary for the functioning of a fair trading system. 
Finally, we conclude with a brief assessment of considerations of the fairness achieved in the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
II. The Utilitarian Principle as a Guide to Fairness 
The mainstream utilitarian principle applied to the trading system derives from the view 
of rational behavior as the maximization of utility. There is a tacit acceptance that the realization 
of a more efficient global economy can be a practically acceptable criterion of fairness. Greater 
efficiency is defined as a movement toward Pareto optimality and, in the context of international 
trade, that state is reached if no country can be made better off without some other country being 
                                                       
3  It  may,  however,  leave  some  initial  biases  untouched  because  they  are  not  part  of  the  negotiating 
agenda. This, for instance, is what happened to agricultural tariffs and subsidies from the 1950s until the 
Uruguay Round in the 1990s. 4 
made worse off. Even in that circumstance, if the losing country can be compensated by the 
gaining country while still leaving the latter better off, that qualifies as a gain in efficiency. This 
utilitarian view of fairness posits that, so long as no country suffers a net loss, there are no 
rational grounds for resisting measures to liberalize trade that benefit the global economy.   
But in our view, this criterion has serious limitations as a basis for assessing fairness in 
the  multilateral  trading  system.  That  is,  the  multilateral  trading  system  consists  of  a  set  of 
agreements among trading partners that has evolved over the decades; and these agreements 
define how the governments of these countries will conduct themselves in their trade relations. It 
is thus a form of cooperation entered into by independent countries for their mutual advantage 
and is not necessarily compatible with the utilitarian principle, since all the participants in the 
system expect some benefit from their participation and none seek per se to maximize global 
welfare. 
But even if we chose to disregard that independent countries cooperate to obtain mutual 
advantage, the utilitarian principle would be a poor guide to fairness. In practical application, the 
analysis  is  based  on  welfare  maximization;  it  compares  the  initial  situation  with  the  final 
situation after the policy change has been put into effect and equilibrium has been restored. The 
difficulty here is that the initial situation is taken as given with respect to the existing distribution 
of income and wealth and the structure of institutions and policies that will reflect the inequities 
built into the system. Thus, for many emerging developing countries, a system of trade rules and 
procedures based on allocative efficiency may well seem unfair to them without consideration of 
the initial conditions. Strongly held differences of opinion on this issue therefore may limit the 
possibilities of agreement about the fairness of rules and procedures based on the efficiency 
criterion. 5 
The  mainstream  efficiency  criterion  has  dominated  much  of  the  commentary  on  the 
multilateral trading system. Unfortunately, this viewpoint abstracts from the world of nation 
states that constitute the key actors in the WTO system. It does not conceive of the trading 
system as an evolving body of rules and procedures that nations have entered into to manage 
their relations in expectation of mutual advantage. 
III. Economic Equity as a Guide 
We favor economic equity as the relevant guiding principle in assessing the fairness of 
the trading system. It focuses on the distribution among nations of the rights and obligations that 
constitute the WTO trading system. As already stated, economic equity breaks down into two 
subsidiary, and related, principles – equality of opportunity and distributive justice. We first 
explore  the  meaning  of  equality  of  opportunity  and  thereafter  consider  how  it  needs  to  be 
qualified to take account of distributive justice. 
Equality of Opportunity 
In some of its specific manifestations, such as nondiscrimination, national treatment and 
fair competition, the principle of equality of opportunity has a long history in trade relations. 
These norms or rules have evolved over time, being adapted to changing circumstances and 
being  extended  to  cover  a  widening  range  of  inter-governmental  conduct.    Their  practical 
application has undoubtedly enhanced the fairness of the trading system 
By ensuring that countries extend the same treatment to all their most favored trading 
partners, nondiscrimination has been of great importance in the evolution of the multilateral 
trading system. From the mid-19
th century onward, adherence to nondiscrimination did much to 
lessen trade rivalries and to provide a foundation for multilateral trade cooperation. However, 6 
while still an important principle of the GATT/WTO agreements, it has lost some of its practical 
significance  in  recent  years  as  regional  and  bilateral  free  trade  agreements  have  multiplied. 
Taken at face value, these agreements run counter to the whole idea of nondiscrimination and so 
detract from equality of opportunity. Through the trade diversion that they cause, these regional 
or bilateral agreements may penalize third countries in ways that, for them, are quite arbitrary. 
However, in recognition that political and trade relations among countries are not set in stone, 
the formation of customs unions (CUs) and free trade areas (FTAs) has long been accepted under 
the  GATT/WTO  agreements.  Member  countries  are  free  to  enter  into  these  preferential 
arrangements  without  legally  breaching  the  principle  of  non-discrimination.  An  intellectual 
defense of this formal inconsistency would be that this is a situation in which the principle of the 
greater good should override that of equality of opportunity. So long as the trade created by the 
CU or FTA is greater than the trade that is diverted, the world is better off.
4  Still, harm is 
nonetheless done to individual third countries.
5 Worse, being negotiated outside the framework 
of the WTO disciplines and procedures, some FTAs reveal a deliberate disregard for the idea of 
fairness  as  understood  in  multilateral  trading  relations.  When  drawn  up  between  a  powerful 
country and a small and weak country (or countries), the former has not always resisted the 
temptation to impose conditions on the latter that would not  be acceptable in less asymmetric 
multilateral  negotiations.
6  The  larger  political  reality,  however,  is  that,  since  virtually  every 
                                                       
4 While raising few objections to such regional agreements as the European Common Market or the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, most trade economists emphasize that the proliferation of FTAs is 
likely to have adverse effects because the tangle of differential tariffs and rules of origin would distort 
trade flows and diminish global efficiency. 
5 It is a fact, however, that affected third countries have quite often been able to take countermeasures – 
notably, negotiating their own FTAs – to lessen the damage.  
6 For example, the conditions that the United States included in its FTAs with Chile and Singapore were 
intended to prevent these countries from resorting  to controls over capital outflows even in the event of a  7 
nation state has entered into at least one FTA, very few voices have been raised denouncing such 
agreements as breaches of nondiscrimination. 
National treatment, which is also embedded in the GATT/WTO rules, is another limited 
expression  of  the  principle  of  equality  of  opportunity.  National  treatment  has  been  closely 
associated  with  the  negotiation  of  reductions  in  border  barriers  since  countries  have  wanted 
assurances that concessions won in reducing these barriers would not be defeated by the use of 
discriminatory domestic measures. In recent decades, as border barriers have diminished and 
increasing  attention  given  to  the  role  of  domestic  regulations  in  impeding  trade,  scrutiny  of 
national practices that might be deemed to be discriminatory has intensified. Indeed, a substantial 
number of the complaints brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body since its establishment 
in 1995 have turned around the question of national treatment.  
Fair competition, though lacking the formal standing of nondiscrimination or national 
treatment,  is  another  norm  that  has  further  extended  the  idea  of  equality  of  opportunity. 
Countries have wanted to be assured that their firms would be able to compete fairly with foreign 
enterprises, whether in foreign or domestic markets, and rules have been introduced to discipline 
the  use  by  governments  of  particular  measures  that  distort  competition.  A  long-standing 
complaint, for instance, had been the use of subsidies that give foreign firms a competitive edge, 
and subsidy agreements now limit or prohibit the use of specific forms of subsidies.  
At least since the initiation of the Uruguay Round in 1986, a decidedly more expansive 
view  of  equality  of  opportunity  has  come  to  permeate  the  discussion  of  multilateral  trade 
relations.  Equality of opportunity, at its extreme limit, would imply that the firms of different 
countries are able to have access to, and to do business in, each others’ markets under the same 
                                                                                                                                                                               
financial crisis. In other bilateral agreements, the United States has also insisted on the enforcement of 
stricter intellectual property rights than prevail under the WTO agreement. 8 
regulatory conditions as they have in their own domestic market. There would, in effect, be a 
single, integrated market. Such a “level playing field” virtually exists for some products in the 
markets of some participants in the trading system, but it is very far from being the rule. To insist 
on such an extreme interpretation of the principle of equality of opportunity would be to make a 
wholly integrated world market the ultimate standard of fairness in multilateral trade. In a world 
of nation states which differ vastly in power, in levels of development, in institutions, and in 
their histories of trade relations, that seems too great an abstraction to be useful. Although the 
trend has been both toward the reduction of barriers at the border and toward some limited 
convergence in domestic regulations, wide differences in the content of countries’ border and 
domestic regulations remain.  
These differences sometimes have origins of an administrative or technical nature such as 
in  customs  procedures  or  technical  standards.  In  these  cases,  there  can  be  sizable  practical 
difficulties in formulating common rules, not least in the overcoming of entrenched interests in 
long established practices. Arriving at a solution is for the most part a matter of finding an 
equitable sharing of the burden of adjustment that countries have to make in order to introduce 
more comparable practices.  
Differences in national regulations or practices, however, may also arise from  strongly 
held social preferences that reflect  countries’ social mores, their institutions, or particular level 
of economic development. These national preferences place valid limits on the scope of the 
multilateral rules that can be negotiated to realize greater equality of opportunity. For instance, in 
the  name  of  fairness,  many  in  the  United  States  and  European  Union  have  advocated  the 
inclusion of labor standards in the WTO agreements as a way of countering competition from 
“sweatshop labor”. Others, especially from emerging countries, have argued strongly against 9 
such an action.  One fear is that such standards would be abused for protectionist purposes. A 
more intrinsic objection is that it is very difficult to arrive at definitions of labor standards that 
are both sufficiently specific for dispute settlement purposes and would be widely acceptable. 
The particular labor standards acceptable in individual countries are shaped uniquely by their 
own social and political histories. As the experience of including labor standards in FTAs has 
demonstrated, the accommodation of distinctively different social norms and practice in common 
rules  has  defeated  negotiators,  and  at  best,  they  have  agreed  that  each  trading  partner  will 
actively undertake to enforce its own labor standards.
7 Again, there are numerous complaints 
directed against the trading system about unfair pricing and many of these instances imply some 
form of restrictive business practice.
8 However, because of national differences in views about 
acceptable forms of business organization, a consensus on competition policy has so far been 
beyond  the  reach  of  WTO  members  and  there  is  no  corresponding  set  of  rules  that  can  be 
applied.  
Clearly, there are  many national regulations and procedures that  presently lie outside the 
scope of WTO disciplines. The firms and individuals of each country may sometimes choose to 
regard the different regulations and procedures of the other countries as unfair but, from the 
viewpoint of the impartial spectator, they can only be described as different. It has to be accepted 
that when the differences reflect strongly held national preferences, these limit the scope for 
multilateral rules that would enhance equality of opportunity (at least so long as the autonomy of 
the individual countries participating in rules formation is respected). 
                                                       
7 For a fuller discussion, see Brown and Stern (2008).  
8  Anti-globalization  critics  find  some  business  practices  unfair  –  for  example,  the  displacement  of 
smallholders by agro-businesses – that are nonetheless accepted or condoned by governments of the 
trading countries. These are more in the nature of criticisms of the social system and lie outside our 
discussion. 10 
Distributive Justice 
In the view that we espouse, the principle of equality of opportunity has to be qualified to 
take account of distributive justice. For most of us, the great disparity in levels of living among 
countries imposes a moral obligation on the richer countries to assist the poorer countries in the 
alleviation of dire poverty. While the provision of financial aid is the most obvious expression of 
this obligation, foreign trade is also widely accepted as a major means of economic betterment; 
and there are therefore grounds for extending favorable trading conditions to these countries.  
But what do favorable conditions mean in the context of the multilateral trading system? 
Distributive justice patently does not mean the utilization of the system to transfer resources 
from rich to poor nations. The trading system is not a vehicle for the transfer of resources but an 
arrangement  for  promoting  commercial  relations  among  firms  and  individuals  in  different 
countries to their mutual benefit. What it can only mean in this context is that the system should 
specially favor the economic growth of the poorer countries; and this can happen in but two 
ways. First, it can improve the access of these countries to foreign markets. This potentially 
contributes  to  their  economic  growth  by  enlarging  the  market  for  domestic  producers  and 
enhancing  specialization;  and  it  can  have  such  beneficial  longer-term  consequences  as  the 
promotion  of  learning,  the  realization  of  economies  of  scale,  and  the  introduction  of 
technological improvements. Second, and − for some − more controversially, the system can 
allow  the  poorer  countries  to  practice  greater  protection  of  their  domestic  markets.  This, 
especially  in  the  earlier  stages  of  development,    potentially  encourages  new  domestic  firms 
(whether nationally or foreign owned) to establish themselves,  to expand production, and to 
make innovations, so that they can form the core of an expanding modern sector. How far the 
GATT/WTO system, which has historically focused primarily on the reciprocal improvement of 11 
market  access  among  trading  partners,  should  be  adapted  to  accommodate  these  two 
developmental objectives has been, and remains, a matter of controversy (it has been a theme 
running through the faltering Doha Development Round), and the positions taken on this issue 
deeply affect views about the fairness of the system. 
Preferred access for developing countries to the markets of the richer countries has long 
been a formal feature of the trading system. Several non-reciprocal preferential programs are 
features of the system. The richer countries launched the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) in the 1970s. In addition, the United States, the European Union, and other developed 
countries operate other, still more favorable schemes for particular groups of countries, such as 
the  countries  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  under  the  U.S.  African  Growth  and  Opportunity  Act 
(AGOA) or the EU Cotonou Agreement that favors the African, Caribbean, and Pacific former 
colonies. Further, the developed countries generally provide still more extensive preferences to 
the least developed countries. 
There  are  grounds  for  skepticism  about  the  practical  value  of  these  preferential 
arrangements  for  developing  countries  as  a  whole.  The  evidence  is  that  the  possibilities  of 
preferential access are far from having been fully utilized, probably because exporters have had 
difficulty in complying with rules of origin or because the transactions cost of the certification 
process  have  outweighed  the  saved  preferential  margin.  More  fundamentally,  a  number  of 
emerging countries – China being the outstanding instance in recent years – have achieved a 
remarkable  export  performance  without  the  benefit  of  any  preferential  treatment.  This  only 
emphasizes  that,  in  the  relatively  open  trading  system  that  now  prevails,  the  dominant 
determinants of export performance lie in the internal economic growth, structural change and 
export-oriented policies of the exporting countries themselves. Such doubts about the practical 12 
value  of  broad-based  preferences
9  may  even  apply,  in  some  degree,  to  the  more  generous 
preferential  arrangements  for  the  least  developed  countries  at  their  earlier  stage  of 
development.
10  
In aiming to ease market access on grounds of distributive justice, the rich countries are 
open to the major criticism that they have confined their efforts to  preferential arrangements for 
tariffs  on  a  range  of  industrial  products  (with  these  countries  excluding  some  of  the  more 
“sensitive” − and usually labor-intensive − products.) This has entirely failed to address some of 
the  more  deeply  embedded  discriminatory  trade  barriers  that  developing  countries  face  in 
exporting to the rich countries. The most stubborn is the tariffs and subsidies with which the rich 
countries protect their agricultural markets. The Agricultural Agreement of the Uruguay Round 
and the uncompleted negotiations of the Doha Development Round have left this bias against 
developing  country  agricultural  exports  largely  unchanged.  Other  embedded  features  of  rich 
countries’ trade barriers are relatively high tariffs on labor-intensive products and the escalation 
of tariffs by degree of processing on primary products.
11 
On the other side of the coin - the protection of their own markets − developing countries 
have sought in multilateral trade negotiations to preserve their margin of protection by insisting 
that they grant less-than-full reciprocity to the rest of the world. In addition, they have sought to 
retain flexibility by binding their tariffs at relatively high levels even though many have made 
                                                       
9 For a review of the literature on the benefits of preferences for developing countries, see Hoekman and 
Ozden (2006). For a more detailed discussion of these doubts, see Brown and Stern ( 2007).  
10 At a forum marking the 10
th anniversary of the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, told delegates: “We all know, despite the best of intentions, Agoa 
has achieved only modest results and has not lived up to the highest hopes of a decade ago….” Financial 
Times, 8/9/10. 
11 Removal of these biases would, it might be noted, be better described as steps toward greater equality 
of opportunity rather than as measures taken in the name of distributive justice to provide particularly 
favorable market access. 13 
substantial cuts in their applied tariffs. Developing countries, however, face a quandary since 
bargaining to gain improved access to the markets of rich countries means offering concessions 
in their own tariffs.  
It is, however, not only more favorable tariff regimes that concern developing countries. 
Equally important – or perhaps more so – is that these countries should enjoy greater flexibility 
in the use of domestic measures that may promote their development but that are subject to WTO 
disciplines.  This is discussed more fully in the next section.  
IV. Fairness in the Negotiation of Trade Agreements 
In the real world, what matters is how far the principle of economic equity is translated 
into practice through multilateral negotiations, and that depends on the fairness of the negotiating 
process. The participating countries have to enjoy both autonomy in their decision making and 
reciprocity in the negotiation of benefits. 
Autonomy 
Multilateral negotiations are conducted on the premise that all member countries will 
concur in the final package of negotiated agreements as a “single undertaking”. The agreements 
are thus based on the consent of the participants, so that the obligations which they accept are 
self-imposed. The voluntary nature of the agreements, however, is by no means sufficient to 
ensure that they are fair. Participants differ greatly in their bargaining power as well as in their 
bargaining skills. The weaker participants may consent to a negotiated agreement simply because 
of their lack of acceptable alternatives. It is quite possible, for example, for a weaker participant 
to  accept  the  outcome  of  a  round  of  negotiations  that  leaves  it  worse  off  than  before.  A 
government could therefore consider in such a circumstance the alternative of withdrawing from 14 
membership of the WTO.  But this would mean the loss of more fundamental rights like most-
favored-nation and national treatment, which would be difficult to give up. 
While  there  has  been  a  significant  shift  since  the  Uruguay  Round  in  the  negotiating 
power  of  participating  countries,  the  balance  of  advantage  still  lies  markedly  with  the  most 
developed countries of North America, Europe, and Japan. Supported by their technological 
leadership and political power, they have hoped that the regime of open-market access which – 
leaving  aside  agriculture  –  they  have  developed    among  themselves,  could  be  enlarged  to 
embrace the developing countries as well. The developing countries, however, have the more 
complex aim of wanting to improve their market access to other countries while defending the 
firms in their emerging modern sectors from being eclipsed by highly competitive, and more 
experienced, foreign enterprises.  
Many suggestions have been made for improvements in the negotiating process so that 
the smaller and weaker countries have a larger voice in the deliberations. Some of the larger 
emerging countries – Brazil, China, India, and South Africa − acquired a new eminence in the 
suspended Doha Development Round. However, “mini-ministerial” meetings deciding common 
positions have still excluded the smaller and weaker countries from participation. Even relatively 
large countries have complained strongly about some negotiating procedures. For example, in the 
Uruguay Round, the major content of the Agreement on Agriculture was drafted by the United 
States and the European Communities – known as the Blair House agreement – and presented to 
the other participants, some of whom were major traders in agricultural products, as a sine qua 
non of the final agreement (Cedro and Vieira, 2010). A more open and inclusive process would 
undoubtedly contribute toward improving the perception that the negotiating process was not 
unduly  weighted  in  favor  of  the  most  powerful  countries;  and,  it  should  be  noted  that  the 15 
Director General of the WTO has made efforts in the course of the Doha Development Round to 
effect  some  improvements  –  such  as  inviting  more  countries  to  participate  in  the  formerly 
exclusionary “Green Room” negotiations.  
The  real test, however, of the fairness of the negotiating process lies in whether the 
outcome is seen to be mutually beneficial for all participants. In other words, if the agreements 
arising out of a round of negotiations are to approach our idea of fairness, it is not enough that 
the  member  countries  should  participate  in  the  negotiations  and  willingly  consent  to  the 
decisions; it is also necessary that the agreements should yield benefit to all. How far such 
reciprocity is met is by no means always easy to determine in actual practice. We explore what 
reciprocity has practically meant in the following section. 
V. What Reciprocity Means Practically 
Regarding Market Access 
In the context of international trade relations, reciprocity has usually been taken to mean 
that  the  participants  in  any  negotiations  enjoy  roughly  equivalent  benefits  or  bear  roughly 
equivalent costs. These benefits and costs, it should be remembered, do not correspond to the   
economist’s  concept  of  economic  welfare.  Mainstream  economists  are  interested  in  the 
consequences  of  trade  liberalization  –  both  the  gain  in  access  to  foreign  markets  and  the 
reduction in trade barriers on imports – in enhancing the efficient use of productive resources in 
the economy. But trade negotiators tend to take a more limited view of benefits and costs; these 
refer primarily to the prospective increases in trade flows that follow from the greater market 
access granted by other trading partners or conceded to other partners.  
In the early post-WW2 days of multilateral trade negotiations, it was relatively clear what 
the  realization  of  equivalence  in  market  access  meant.  Countries,  which  were  almost  all 16 
developed countries, negotiated reductions of industrial tariffs or quantitative restrictions on a 
product-by-product basis that involved comparable amounts of trade.  Introduction of across-the-
board cuts of tariffs did not seriously impair this perception of equivalence. An equal percentage 
cut  in  tariffs  across-the-board  was  taken  to  imply  equivalent  gains  in  market  access,  an 
assumption  made  more  plausible  by  the  fact  that  trade  among  the  developed  countries  was 
largely intra-industry trade. The effects of the tariff-cutting formulae, however, became more 
complicated as they endeavored to take account of differences among countries in tariff peaks 
and  to  differentiate  among  developed  and  developing  countries  and  as    countries  sought  to 
exempt lists of specific products from the cuts. It can very reasonably be maintained that the 
greater complexity in the formulae evolved as a consequence of efforts to improve the fairness of 
trade-liberalization agreements. However, the effect of the adopted methodology combined with 
the increasing number of countries participating in the negotiations has been that, for many 
individual countries, any close correspondence between the gains in market access granted and 
received has ceased to be apparent.  Finger, Reincke, and Castro (2002) demonstrated this clearly 
for the Uruguay Round. They found that the tariff cuts and affected trade flows that were granted 
and received by many individual countries failed to balance out.  
There  is  a  further  complication  in  the  assessment  of  reciprocity.  It  is  quite  often  an 
oversimplification to say that the benefits and costs of gains in market access can be equated 
with  the  expected  changes  in  trade  volumes.  Trade  negotiators  often  have  also  to  take  into 
account the political costs of the domestic adjustments that are generated by the lowering of 
import barriers. The question then becomes whether the proposed gains in market access more 
than balance the political and social costs of the adjustments that have to be made. For instance, 
in  the  negotiations  conducted  on  agricultural  market  access  during  the  suspended  Doha 17 
Development Round, the United States negotiators were concerned that U.S farmers would not 
accept  the  proposed  reductions  in  agricultural  subsidies  unless  they  were  compensated  by 
sufficiently large gains in access to foreign markets. Again, the EU was reluctant to reduce its 
agricultural tariffs significantly if its firms in the manufacturing and service industries failed to 
enjoy sufficient gains in market access and act as a counterweight to the agricultural interests. 
For their part, India and China (as well as more developed countries like Japan and South Korea) 
were concerned with the social and political effects of lowering their agricultural tariff barriers 
on their huge peasant populations. The question for negotiators from each country was whether 
the balance of conflicting domestic interests was acceptable. 
Still, despite these complications, it does appear that in the bargaining to  improve market 
access  through  tariff  reductions,  inter-country  reciprocity  is  not  entirely  forgotten.  Though 
equivalence  may  not  be  a  primary  concern  in  the  final  stages  of  negotiations,  countries 
nonetheless want to be assured that all participants have made “an appropriate contribution” to 
the enhancement of market access (Finger, Reincke, and Castro, 2002). 
When it comes to the service industries, equivalent gains in market access have again 
been  a  relevant  concern  in  negotiations  among  the  rich  countries.  Having  highly  developed 
service industries, most of these countries have been able to see opportunities for expansion in 
each others’ markets if market access is improved. Between developed and developing countries, 
however,  the  possibilities  for  negotiating  equivalent  gains  in  market  access  are  much  more 
limited, since the latter’s service industries are generally less developed (though there are some 
notable exceptions such as  some IT services or construction services). As a consequence, the 
market opening of service industries in developing countries has tended to be a more one-sided 
gain for the rich countries. 18 
The conclusion  we can draw is that, when trade negotiations to improve market access 
were very largely among the developed countries, the idea of reciprocity – understood to imply 
equivalence  –  may  have  worked  well  enough.  But  when  the  participating  countries  are  as 
numerous and varied as they are today, it becomes a much less transparent and effective guide to 
fairness. The dissimilarities among countries in productive structures are too great to allow for 
intra-sectoral reciprocity.  There is further the fact that, as discussed in the next section, the 
supporting rules of the WTO system also have both effects on market access and create costs for 
countries. Thus, the assessment of reciprocity has to be made not only on the basis of border 
barriers but also in regard to changes in the system as a whole. We will return to this point after 
commenting on the process of rule formation. 
Regarding Rule Formation  
Besides drawing up agreements on reductions in tariffs and other principal  barriers to 
market access, the rounds of GATT/WTO negotiations have produced a growing number of 
other rules that improve equality of opportunity. These rules may seek to remove impediments to 
trade  that  arise  from  complex  or  opaque  domestic  regulations;  or  they  try  to  prevent  the 
discriminatory  use  of  these  regulations;  or  they  prohibit  or  limit  the  use  of  measures  by 
governments that are considered to constitute unfair interventions in freely competitive private-
enterprise markets. Some major examples are customs procedures and valuation methods,  health 
and safety standards, and subsidies. 
While governments have collectively consented to these rules, the adoption of specific 
rules has not necessarily been to the benefit of all. Since it is the agendas of the most powerful 
countries that primarily drive rule formation, there is evidently no assurance of reciprocity in the 
negotiation of particular rules. This said, we should nonetheless first note that some rules do give 19 
rise  to  net  benefits  that  are  generally  shared.  This  is  most  probably  the  case  where  the 
impediments to trade have arisen largely from technical differences among countries. Customs 
procedures and standards are instances. The agreements reached during the Tokyo Round on 
standards,  for  example,  brought  greater  uniformity  into  the  technical  regulations  that  were 
applied nationally to individual products. While recognizing the right of countries to devise their 
own regulations in matters like health, the environment, and consumer safety, the agreements 
encouraged countries to move toward internationally agreed standards that would facilitate the 
flow of trade. Greater transparency in national inspection and certification procedures has also 
been required, lessening the fear that technical standards might be used in a discriminatory way. 
Countries have recognized a common benefit in conforming their regulations. 
A significant qualification, however, to the fairness of introducing such new rules arises 
from  the  fact  that  numerous  developing  countries  face  considerable  practical  problems  in 
implementing  them.  It  has,  for  instance,  often  proved  burdensome  for  countries  to  have  to 
comply with technical standards set by developed countries that require complex certification 
and testing procedures. Moreover, there are numerous countries that do not have long histories as 
independent states and are without well established central administrations or whose small size 
gives  rise  to  administrative  diseconomies;  and  they  have  difficulty  meeting  their  formal 
obligations without undue strain on their resources. It is true that some leeway has generally been 
granted the poorest countries under clauses according “special and differential treatment,” but 
these have often been unrealistically time limited.  
The fairness of rules is less clear cut when these attempt to reconcile different national 
practices that are rooted in strongly held national preferences. It has long been recognized, for 
instance, that subsidies could nullify or impair market-access commitments made by countries in 20 
trade  negotiations,  and  that  some  multilateral  discipline  was  accordingly  needed.  But,  while 
virtually  all  countries  make  use  of  subsidies  for  diverse  economic  or  social  purposes,  their 
practices vary widely. The differences in the economic use of subsidies turn essentially on the 
perceived role of the state in the economy. The United States has emphasized reliance on market-
based  decisions  (at  least  in  buoyant  times)  and,  in  the  Uruguay  Round,  it  sought  a  broad 
definition  of  what  constitutes  a  subsidy  and  a  narrow  definition  of  subsidies  that  were  not 
“actionable”  under  GATT/WTO  rules.  Most  other  countries,  both  developed  and  emerging, 
sought a more restricted definition of a subsidy and more inclusive definition of non-actionable 
subsidies. Compromises were made for the sake of reaching some agreement, but that clearly left 
room for a range of views – based on different economic beliefs – about the fairness of the 
adopted rule. 
Some new rules introduced by developed countries, however, have patently not been 
based on any recognition of mutual advantage. They have been advanced on the basis of superior 
bargaining power and are particularly hard to defend as fair. A major criticism voiced by the 
emerging countries of the rules formed during the Uruguay Round is that some placed undue 
constraints on their development-policy options. The new subsidy rule just mentioned was one 
source of concern. So too was the agreement on investment (TRIMS) that put restrictions on 
national development policies, most especially in prohibiting  the use of restrictions on import 
content of  foreign direct investment in order to promote backward linkages. In this context, 
acknowledgment by the developed countries of the principle of distributive justice has largely 
been  confined  to  the  “special  and  differential  treatment”  accorded  to  the  least  developed 
countries. 21 
The agreement on intellectual property rights (IPRs) stands on its own as a particularly 
egregious  instance  of  a  new  condition  being  introduced  into  the  WTO  system  of  rules  and 
procedures  without  an  adequate  basis  of  common  consent.  For  a  number  of  countries,  the 
Agreement on TRIPS lacked any evidence of net benefit and, indeed, was clearly negative for 
some. Moreover, until later modified, it rode roughshod over the public-goods preferences of 
many countries for the health of their populations.   
VI. A More Inclusive Assessment 
Given  the  comprehensive  nature  of  trade  negotiations  covering  both  market  access 
agreements and rules agreements, we need to ask whether fairness is respected when we take all 
the agreements together as a single package. Do the negotiations promote greater equality of 
opportunity and do they enhance distributive justice? There is unfortunately no common measure 
of  the  gains  in  opportunity  to  trade  of  individual  countries  or  groups  of  countries  and  only 
subjective, qualitative assessments can be made. Moreover, a comprehensive assessment has to 
allow for the possibility of large differences in adjustment costs and for possible restrictions in 
the freedom to pursue developmental measures that restrict market access. 
Take  the  Uruguay  Round  as  an  example.  If  we  look  at  its  outcome,  it  would  be 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  at  least  the  rich  countries  moved  toward  greater  equality  of 
opportunity through the roughly comparable reciprocal measures that they adopted in each of the 
major areas of negotiation. In industrial tariffs, for example, though the average reduction was 
not identical, the differences were small and tariff levels were, in any case, low. In a number of 
service  industries,  negotiators  gained  comparable  treatment  in  each  others’  markets,  an 
improvement that their comparably developed service industries were able to take advantage of. 
In agricultural trade, both the U.S and the European Communities very largely succeeded in 22 
preserving most of the measures that protected their own industries.  In the formation of new 
rules, it is true that they did not always share the same views – as, for example, on subsidies − 
but they mostly had similar concerns and neither side dominated the final agreements. 
In assessing the outcome of the negotiations between the rich countries and the emerging 
or developing countries, the question is more complicated. We have to ask not simply whether 
the negotiations brought reciprocal gains for both groups of countries (in terms of improved 
market access), but also whether the gains favored the emerging or developing countries; and we 
have  further  to  ask  whether  there  were  large  adjustment  costs  or  loss  of  freedom  to  utilize 
developmental measures. The task is made yet more difficult by the fact that there is not the 
same  intra-sectoral  comparability  in  the  concessions  given  and  received  as  there  is  among 
developed countries alone.  
In the trade of manufactures, the most dramatic gain for the developing countries was 
purportedly the gradual dismantling of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA).  They also benefitted 
from the general tariff reduction of the rich countries.  In return, many developing countries 
bound  their  tariffs  and  removed  quotas  or  made  limited  reductions  in  their  bound  tariffs. 
(However, the wide gap between bound and applied tariffs, robbed some tariff concessions of 
much practical significance. On the other hand, numerous countries were unilaterally reducing 
their tariffs.) In agriculture, the developed countries made little in the way of concessions, thus 
failing to improve market access for the appreciable number of developing countries with a 
strong comparative advantage in agricultural products. While developed countries appreciably 
liberalized  access  to  some  service  sectors  –  notably,  the  financial  and  telecommunications 
industries – there were substantially fewer concessions made by developing countries since their 23 
service sectors were less developed. Still, the concessions  made on both sides very largely 
benefitted the service industries of the developed countries. 
Among the new rules adopted in the Uruguay Round, some had market-opening effects in 
developing countries. But there were also other, and probably more important, consequences of 
the new rules that were introduced. First, some deprived developing countries of flexibility in the 
measures they could use to promote their development. Second, the introduction into the system 
of trade rules of a new regime on intellectual property rights placed new restrictions and costs on 
the developing countries in the use of new technologies. Third, for many smaller countries, the 
new rules added to the administrative costs of participating in the system. 
What  can  we  conclude  then  about  the  fairness  of  the  Round?  In  terms  of  the  other 
principle  of  equality  of  opportunity,  when  considered  alone,  both  developed  and  developing 
countries won some improvements in access to each other’s markets, and the gains may possibly 
not  have  been  too  dissimilar.  The  difficulty  comes  when  we  introduce  the  principle  of 
distributive justice. The improvements in market access made by developed countries did little to 
remove major trade barriers like agricultural protection or other biases like tariff peaks on labor- 
intensive products. In supporting rules, while the developmental status of the poorer countries 
was formally recognized through such measures as special and differential treatment, the broad 
thrust of the agreements adopted in the Round was to restrict the space that developing countries 
had to use developmental measures.  
Procedural Justice 
We have already commented on procedural justice in the negotiation of trade agreements. 
But  if  fairness  is  to  be  respected,  it  is  not  less  important  in  the  implementation  of  these 24 
agreements.  A  fair  dispute  settlement  procedure  is  necessary  to  resolve  the  differences  in 
interpretation of rules that inevitably arise. 
Most commentators would agree that the dispute settlement procedure established in the 
WTO  has  worked  well.  No  one  has  seriously  questioned  the  impartiality  of  the  Dispute 
Settlement Body. Moreover, it has been careful in its judgments not to venture beyond the limits 
set by the rules that were established consensually by the member countries. Of course, trade 
lawyers and diplomats have often disagreed with the particular judgments made in specific cases. 
Each adjudicator brings his or her own normative or causal beliefs to the interpretation of the 
rules and the review of the evidence, but – as we observed in the introduction – so long as the 
process is conducted impartially, its fairness is not in question. 
One  major complaint that can be made against the dispute settlement procedure is that it 
demands specialized legal and informational expertise to present and argue a case. Many smaller 
and poorer countries are thus put at a serious disadvantage since they have numerous other 
competing claims on their limited resources.
12 It has also sometimes been argued that smaller 
countries are at another disadvantage in disputes with large countries because their power to 
enforce any ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body is slight.  If a small country is authorized to 
raise its import duties against a large country because the latter fails to conform to a ruling, the 
effect of its action will be much less than if the positions are reversed. However, the experience 
so far has been that – for reputational reasons – the powerful have been willing to respect the 
rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body. 
13   
                                                       
12 For a discussion of this point, see Hoekman and Mavroidis (2000).  
13 For a more detailed discussion of fairness in the dispute settlement process, see Brown and Stern 
(2009). 25 
VII. Conclusion 
The completion of the Uruguay Round and the founding of the WTO were a milestone in 
the long struggle to establish a rules-based system governing multilateral trade relations. The 
evolution of this system has made possible, though it has not assured, the advancement toward 
greater economic equity in trade relations. 
Ideas  of  fairness  have  been  translated  into  practice  through  successive  rounds  of 
negotiations. For the large developed countries – primarily the United States and the European 
Union – a key issue in the negotiation of greater market access and improved rules has been 
whether benefits have been perceived to be reciprocal. Through these negotiations, they have 
moved gradually toward the realization of greater equality of opportunity in their trade relations. 
However, for the growing membership of emerging or developing countries – many of whom 
were non-members or only passive members until the Uruguay Round – we have argued that, in 
the  name  of  fairness,  equality  of  opportunity  should  also  be  qualified  by  the  principle  of 
distributive justice.  
Taking greater equality of opportunity on its own, its realization in negotiations between 
developed and developing countries has been difficult to assess. The differences between these 
countries, and among the developing countries themselves, in levels of living and economic 
structures have not allowed any close matching of reciprocal benefits. Still, though there have 
not  necessarily  been  reciprocal  gains  in  market  access  or  in  the  improvement  of  rules,  the 
imbalances  may  not  have  been  too  great  for  most  countries.  The  rounds  of  negotiations 
conducted so far, however, have left some long embedded impediments to trade on both sides 
largely untouched. 26 
In qualifying the principle of equality of opportunity to meet the demands of distributive 
justice, the weight given by an impartial spectator to the latter  depends on his or her causal, as 
well as, normative beliefs. There are valid differences of view about the place of protectionist 
trade measures in national economic development. The same spectator may, moreover, very 
reasonably modify his or her causal beliefs in the light of the size and resource endowment of the 
specific country or countries being considered. In other words, if fairness is defined by equality 
of opportunity qualified by a sense of distributive justice, we have to accept that there is always 
scope for differences in impartial judgments about the fairness of any trading system. The best 
we can do is to ensure that the system accommodates these differences of view by not allowing 
one viewpoint to dominate the rules and procedures. 
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